The transformation of work and labor policies is one of the most underresearched aspects of China's political economy in recent decades. Western perceptions of Chinese workplaces are mostly informed by images of privatization and downsizing of traditional state-socialist enterprises, or by the infamous sweatshops serving the production networks of global brandname companies under miserable conditions. However, recent research reveals that labor politics in China have become highly diversified, in spite of the apparently centralized character of the political regime. At the same time, labor conflicts are on the rise across industries and regions.
The reform of labor markets and labor policies is emerging as a key issue in the re-balancing of China's economy in the wake of the global financial and economic crisis 2008-09.
1 Sustainable economic growth centered on the domestic market and based on rising incomes for large sectors of the working population inevitably requires more stable regulation of wages and employment at the shop-floor and at sectoral and regional levels, especially in key manufacturing industries. The existing system of labor relations in China hardly contains any contractual safeguards for workers' wages, working hours and benefits, and Chinese trade unions still lack the institutional independence to act as agents of collective representation and bargaining. Hence, the emerging challenges seem of some historical magnitude, comparable perhaps to the construction of the post-war social contracts in industrialized societies following the U.S. New Deal and the economic and social Pax Americana of the 1950s and 1960s.
Against this background, this paper attempts a new approach to analyze labor relations at the level of companies, industries and regions in China. 2 The analysis refers to Western and Chinese labor sociology and industrial relations theory, applying the concept of "regimes of production" to the context of China's emerging capitalism. The focus is on China's modern core manufacturing industries, i.e., steel, 3 chemical, auto, electronics, and textile and garments. The research explores regimes of production in major corporations and new forms of labor-management cooperation, the growing inequality and fragmentation of labor policies within the modern sectors of the Chinese economy, consequences for further reform regarding labor standards, collective bargaining, and workers' participation.
The paper introduces current Chinese and international debates on the changing character of labor relations in China (section 1) and relates to the changing patterns of economic and social control in the relevant industries (section 2).
Conceptual and analytical perspectives on regimes of production in modern Chinese manufacturing industries will be explained in depth in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 will explore the relationship between the emerging forms of management control and the lack of institutionalized labor relations based on collective bargaining and democratic participation of the workforce.
In conclusion, the weakness of shop-floor institutions regulating capitalist labor relations in developed industrial environments is identified as a major obstacle for a transformation of China's model of economic growth towards higher wage incomes and expanded domestic consumption for broad layers of the working population. At the same time, the limits of labor policies focusing on reforms of the legal foundations of the individual labor contract rather than collective representation and democratic control become visible. Before this background, a corporatist transformation of labor relations as envisaged by many policy makers in China seems to be far away. 3 However, the increasing number of individual and collective labor conflicts, particularly, the wave of strikes in the automobile manufacturing sector in South
China in May and June 2010, are calling for fundamental reforms in China's labor system.
3 Our analysis is based on more than 30 detailed case studies of major companies in the respective industries and selected suppliers, resulting from a research project carried out by the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in cooperation with leading academic institutions in the field in China, with support from Hans-Böckler Foundation. In this paper, the results of these case studies will only be presented in generalized form. For a full version of the report, please contact the author.
Changing labor relations -conceptual approaches and perspectives
Debates on reform of labor policies are a persistent topic among social, economic and legal experts in China, although not highly publicized and mostly disregarded by Western media. These debates focus on the question of how to create tripartite (i.e. three-party) mechanisms between management, trade unions and government to ensure "harmonious labor relations" in an advancing industrial economy. Many aspects of these debates seem surprisingly familiar to Westerners, since Chinese scholars often resort to concepts of "tripartism", "corporatism" or "social partnership" as developed after the birth of modern industrial relations systems during the New Deal period in the U.S. and after Germany's seminal works council legislation in the early 1920s. Western-based academics have also used such concepts to analyze the current changes in Chinese labor relations -sometimes coupled with the hope that labor systems rooted in European or Japanese "coordinated market economies" 4 may promise a better future to Chinese workers than the market liberal U.S. model.
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However, such an analysis has to deal with two basic difficulties. First, Chinese trade unions (as well as employers' organizations) mostly lack the popular legitimation and independence from government and capital -the basic conditions for representation of workers interests within tripartite systems of bargaining and policymaking. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the restructuring of labor relations in China is increasingly taking place under those Western and Japanese models of production and labor management-cooperation that have undermined the prevailing forms of collective representation, industry-wide bargaining and job security, i.e., the foundations of what was known as the post-War social contract in industrialized countries. In spite of the truely unique characteristics of China's transformation, there seems to be at least some convergence concerning the breadand-butter problems of trade unionism and labor organizing in the context of globalized patterns of capitalist organization and control. In the absence of such social institutions to mediate labor conflicts, factories are a highly sensitive terrain, where the social contradictions between workers and management become manifest and have to be regulated.
Against this background, our analysis cannot assume a political framework of historically established, stable institutions and actors in industrial relations. Rather, we have to focus on the transformation of such institutions, the emergence of new institutional arrangements and "best practice" models of labor relations as well as the fragmented character of political regulation, especially between central and local government agencies. For such a dynamic perspective on changing social power relations, we refer to the concept of "politics" and "regimes" of production, which has been applied in various forms to recent studies of Chinese labor relations as well as to the analysis of work and labor policies in global production networks.
12 Table 1 "Tripartism with four parties" -"三方四主体"
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Diverging patterns of economic restructuring and control
In the face of China's massive industrialization and the rapid development of modern and complex production environments over a broad spectrum of industries, we have to widen our perspective beyond the concept of "old" and "new", stateowned and private industries, and the related changes in the working class. We need to explore the growing differences in company labor relations, resulting from chains. Here, lay-offs of millions of migrant workers occurred, in some cases with 13 massive protests from the workers. Industries primarily producing for the domestic market, such as auto or chemicals, were less affected and could also benefit from the Chinese government's massive spending programs. These industries could mostly avoid major lay-offs and tried to keep their core workforces on the payroll, often with drastic reductions of working hours and pay. In the steel industry, this strategy faced major difficulties, since many steel companies, especially smaller, local ones, collapsed under the impact of shrinking demand from key customer industries, construction and shipbuilding in particular. Restructuring is now focusing on largescale take-overs of smaller steel producers through the globally oriented SOEs; however, the recent wave of protests in this industry indicates the social sensitivity of such a strategy.
Regimes of production in core industries
As the transformation of production in China increasingly reflects the segmentations of work and the working class in the capitalist world economy, the once centralized regime of labor policies is rapidly becoming multi-faced, too. Only few scholars in China and abroad have seriously tackled this issue.
Western-based labor sociology has recently produced a number of studies of the Chinese workplace as a contested terrain between management and workers, where struggles and compromises create certain regimes of production.
17 Most notably, Lee Ching Kwan's studies of labor regimes at factory and local community levels have found profound differences between labor regimes and the patterns of workers resistance in traditional heavy industry areas in the North, where mostly urban workers in former state-owned enterprises were losing their once life-long jobs, and in the new export production bases in South China, where migrant workers are forming a new mass workforce under highly instable conditions.
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Before this background, diverging regimes of production are analyzed in China's "rustbelt" and "sunbelt". In the older industrial areas, workers' reproduction is heavily dependent on wages, benefits, housing, and social services provided by their 14 urban work units -the heritage of the "social contract" of the Mao-period, to which workers are also resorting as a source of legitimitation for protest and resistance. In the world market factories of the South, workers reproduction is completely based on their meager wages from factory work, with no other social safety network than the rural economy and family-based land rights in their home villages. In this environment, workers protest does not refer to the social values of earlier periods of socialism, but to the newly created laws and legal regulations on workers' rights, directed at creating a certain "rule of law" (yifazhiguo) at the workplace. These different institutional settings also result in different forms of workers protest: "protests of desperation" in the case of veteran state workers leveraging political bargaining strategies by attacking local officials; "protests of discrimination" in the case of migrant workers with no bargaining resources from traditional political environments but a clear sense of their second-class citizen status as rural migrants.
However, against the background of the rapid differentiation of conditions of production in Chinese core industries traced above, the analysis of diverging regimes of production needs to be broadened, in order to capture the different conditions in the respective industries and local environments. Also, the regimes of production have to be discussed in the context of different forms of workplace politics inside factories, embedded in models of production, management systems, work organization, factory rules, wage systems, recruitment policies, performance control, In our analysis of company-based regimes of production, this concept is For the empirical evaluation of production regimes, a set of 25 criteria was created, referring to basic aspects of the model of production, of the organization of work and working conditions, and of labor relations. The evaluation of these criteria is based on qualitative data from interviews, company visits and relevant external sources. The evaluation criteria will also be ranked in simple form on a three-level scale (low, medium, high) related to prevailing industry standards in China, in order to facilitate comparison between cases. Most of the ranking is based on our subjective judgment of qualitative information and observations made during company visits.
Some of the criteria involve quantitative data, based on the information we could obtain from companies, such as employment figures, wages and wage ladders. Our ranking of wage flexibility is based on the proportion of the flexible element of wages and salaries (overtime, bonuses, and allowances), related to the average regular monthly income of employees. A proportion of 40-50% of flexible income is rated as high, 25-40% as medium, and of 25% and below as "low." In the auto industry the corporate bureaucratic regime of production (also dubbed "multinational/joint venture classic") is the standard model. Due to the dominance of large-scale joint ventures in this sector, there are only few variations.
The emerging independent Chinese automakers seem to follow this pattern as well, since they are closely imitating the management and quality control strategies of foreign multinationals. However, some newer factories set up in recent times in rural areas (such as GM Wuling, General Motors' highly successful joint venture in light van production located in Guizhou province) may be closer to a "corporate high performance" regime of production. Also, this pattern as well as regimes of flexible mass production of "classic" low wage production may have stronger roles in the car supply sector, creating many options to transfer work into less costly social environments along the supply chain.
In contrast to the auto industry, the electronics industry is much more diverse, mainly due to the massive segmentation of this sector along production models and between brandname and non-brandname companies, but also as a result of different strategies of HR management emerging from the global restructuring of the industry.
Among major brandname companies and also chipmakers "corporate bureaucratic,"
"corporate high performance" and "low-wage classic" regimes of production can all be found. "Corporate high performance" can probably be seen as the dominant pattern, emerging from the dominance of such regimes and the ongoing transformation of the IT-industry in the global arena. However, "state-bureaucratic" regimes of production are mostly absent from the electronics industry, since "classical" state-owned enterprises do not play any role in this sector. The manufacturing segments of the electronics industry are heavily dominated by regimes of "flexible mass production,"
epitomized by the large-scale factories and industrial parks of the major global EMSand ODM-companies. Some of the contract manufacturers not investigated in our study seem to be closer to the model of classical low-wage production, the same is true for the huge sector of electronics component suppliers, including many large ones with strong technology base.
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The other industries investigated in our project also have their distinct configurations of regimes of production. In the steel industry, which is controlled by Finally, in the textile and garment industry the "low-wage classic" regime of production prevails. The low-wage character of garment manufacturing is intrinsically linked to the small shop-environment in which most of the relevant processes are performed. The production models of these companies are characterized not only by their dependency from orders of brandname retail companies and related international and national trading houses, but also by tightly knit divisions of labor between small manufacturers in garment production districts, where work is constantly being shifted between manufacturers of various specializations. The network-based character of production can be seen as a specific way to integrate large amounts of manual labor under conditions of highly segmented work without the investment requirements and social costs of large factory environments. Such production models provide enormous flexibility, adaptive to the extremely cyclical development of global consumer markets. At the same time, the availability of such production networks limits the need to concentrate and centralize garment production in bigger factories or companies -a major obstacle to industrial upgrading in this field.
Under these conditioins, only few companies are undertaking the risk to upgrade production and human resource practices. In the cases we studied, the companies were moving toward a "flexible mass production" regime of production.
It should be noticed, however, that the differentiations between regimes of production become increasingly relevant within industries. This has to be stated particularly with regard to the rapid proliferation of outsourcing and modularization of production, especially in assembly industries such as automotive, electronics and textile and garment manufacturing. In the latter two industries, most manufacturing is performed on the base of full-scale outsourcing and subcontracting, resulting in relatively homogenous conditions among manufacturers with mostly flexible mass production or low-wage classic regimes of production, on the one hand, and relatively well paid tech specialists, clerical workers and sales workers in "factoryless" brand name and trading firms, on the other. Automobile manufacturing provides the most complex picture, since the industry has seen a massive implementation of Western and Asian models of modular production during the recent decade, which completely reversed the traditionally vertically integrated structure of auto production within large 
Production regimes and management prerogative
The case studies reveal the growing diversity of production regimes, but also certain patterns of control and labor policies in the respective sectors of the Chinese industrial economy. The regimes represent some generic institutional patterns and social practices, which can be found in various sectors and locations under different conditions, resulting in similar sets of power relations between management, employees and government. This also points to uniformities in labor policies among major corporations, manifesting themselves in best practice models of HR management and corporate policies, disseminated among HR specialists, academic communities, consultants, law firms, etc. Such common practices indicate that capitalist companies in China's "market-socialist" economy are not simply trying to evade control of their labor practices by the state at its various levels. Rather, there are certain patterns of strategic behavior of employers towards law reform, government policies, individual grievances of workers at the shop-floor and in labor courts, collective labor conflicts and public concerns over labor standards. The staggering uniformity of the major two contract manufacturers' reactions to labor policy reforms and pressures from NGOs and the Chinese public concerning working conditions of migrant workers in their factories provide a good illustration.
Such uniformity in strategic behavior at the level of day-to-day practices supports the analysis of Chinese labor relations scholars that employers' interests in China's contemporary political system increasingly appear in organized and coordinated forms, as has been visible in the debates over labor law reform or the recent attempts of employers to topple key provisions of the labor contract law through exemptional policies recommended by central and local and government agencies.
22 Also, employers' influence on labor policies continues to be particularly strong at the local level, resulting in all sets of tacit preferential practices for certain companies or industries and in fragmented regulation of labor standards even between and within cities, as our comparative case studies of three factories of a major electronics contract manufacturer demonstrate in particular. However, the highly politicized nature of the regulation of shop-floor labor practices under the various regimes of production does by no means imply that companies would be interested in the regulation of basic labor standards such as wages, working hours, benefits, seniority rules etc. at industry, regional, or local levels. As companies of all kinds and nationalities in China seem to enjoy almost unlimited management prerogatives over basic working conditions at the shop-floor, there obviously is little need to coordinate basic labor policies vis-à-vis employee representations, trade unions, government or party through employers' organizations or bargaining associations. Coordination of basic labor standards, therefore, remains limited to certain informal consultations on pay for higher-skilled jobs at local levels and "gentlemen agreements" between HR managers on non-poaching, etc.
In the absence of collective bargaining, the interaction of management and government policies and the established practices of employee representation by trade unions (where present) create sets of legal, political and also "moral" rules under which certain elements of the wage relation are being regulated, while others are omitted or subject to some kind of non-binding consultation between employers and employee representations. Together, this creates a segmented system of rules with varying degrees of formal institutionalization in Chinese workplaces, defining the context of employee-management relations under the various regimes of production.
As the adjacent table may help to explain, there are certain sets of "hard" and "soft" rules as well as a whole set of relations that follow "no rules" other than management prerogative.
"Hard rules" can be considered laws, government regulations, and also the basic provisions of collective contracts related to the procedures of consultation between management and employee representations. Such hard rules mainly relate to the requirement to sign labor contracts, laws and regulations on working hours, overtime, occupational safety and health, temporary labor, and minimum wages. The labor systems of companies with state bureaucratic, corporate bureaucratic and corporate high performance regimes of production usually accept such rules, companies in the flexible mass production and the low-wage classic categories have increased acceptance in reaction to labor policy reforms and growing consciousness of workers about their legal rights at the workplace. Most elements of the wage relation at shop-floor level concerning pay, incentive policies and the organization and quality of work are not subject to any legal, contractual or otherwise institutionalized rules. This is true for the precise amount of hourly and monthly wages, wage categories and job classifications, work speed, incentives and performance control, work organization, seniority rights and the entire field of collective labor conflicts, deemed non-existent under present Chinese labor laws. In the various regimes or production analyzed in this study, these "bread-andbutter" issues of capital-labor relations remain largely unregulated by legal norms or binding collective agreements, even in companies with highly formalized labor relations The lack of effective collective regulations of basic wages, working hours and working conditions based on contractual agreements can be seen as the common element among the different regimes of production across companies and industries, state and privately dominated sectors alike. The high degree of flexibility of wages and employment conditions seems to be the common element of "high end" and "low end" workplace regimes, often coupled with extensive overtime work. However, working hard for relatively low pay is not a biological predisposition of Chinese workers. Rather, the incentive for workers' discipline and austerity are built into the systems of wages, performance evaluation and work organization and the resulting competition among workers in Chinese workplaces
The absence of socially accepted and contractually sanctioned labor standards has not only produced enormous inequality in wages, fostering often extreme competition between companies for skilled workers and the related labor shortages at all levels. It can also be seen as a major cause for the extreme income Western labor movements can contribute many important experiences for this learning process, provided Western trade unions will be able to defend basic labor standards and their collective regulation on their own turf.
